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From as early as the fifth century B.C. when Herodotus described the
auctioning of women for service as wives in Babylonia, scholars have
evinced a keen interest in the conduct of auctions.1 Although auctions are
no longer a vehicle for exploiting women, the auction process remains of
particular interest to economists.2 Economists are interested in the effi-
cient allocation of resources, and auctions are widely, if erroneously,
viewed as the optimal means of allocating resources.
In the world of commerce and industry, owners utilize an incredibly
diverse range of sales techniques when they wish to dispose of their as-
sets. While purchasers and sellers may haggle, bargain, and negotiate
about asset prices in flea markets and European bazaars, at grocery stores
one does not expect to bargain over price. Similarly, while certain goods
are sold to distributors on consignment, other goods are transferred on an
"as is" basis. And, of course, certain items such as mineral rights, fine art,
and certain government securities are sold at auctions. These auctions
vary a great deal depending on the type of asset being sold.
Upon reflection, the existence of such a rich array of trading mecha-
nisms should be unsurprising. Asset owners have a clear incentive to max-
imize the price of the goods they are selling. Buyers, on the other hand,
wish to pay as little as possible, and in no case will they pay more than
the value of the goods to them. Furthermore, the value of any good to a
potential buyer will be reduced by an amount sufficient to compensate a
buyer for the costs associated with consummating the transaction. These
costs include the risk that a product will be unsuitable for the buyer's
needs, the costs of obtaining and verifying information about the product,
and all other costs associated with the transaction, including the actual
costs of bid preparation.
In a world of high information, signalling, and transactions costs, as-
set owners will try to devise ways to lower costs to buyers in order to
.. Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.A. Harvard, 1977; J.D. Yale, 1982.
1. Milgrom & Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982). See also R. CASSADY, AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING (1967)
(describing other historical uses for auctions).
2. Literature surveys and bibliographies have turned up hundreds upon hundreds of
articles from economics journals on this topic. See, e.g., Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Auctions and
Bidding Models: A Survey, 26 MGMT. SCI. 119 (1980); Stark & Rothkopf, Competitive Bid-
ding: A Comprehensive Bibliography, 27 OPERATIONS RES. 364 (1979).
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obtain higher prices for themselves. And, because the cost to purchasers
of acquiring an asset varies widely depending on the particular character-
istics of the asset being sold, it is not surprising that the market has gen-
erated such a rich array of sales devices. The point of this article is that
these observations apply with the same force to the sale of firms in the
market for corporate control as they do to the sale of other assets.
Despite the seemingly obvious nature of this observation, a recent
spate of important Delaware decisions has established that corporate
boards for directors have a duty to conduct an auction or its equivalent
whenever they wish to effectuate a change in control of their firm.3 In
addition, the precise way in which this auction is structured is strictly
regulated by the Delaware courts. Thus, in management buyout transac-
tions for example, it generally will be necessary for a company to conduct
an auction before consummating the transaction.
Perhaps even more surprising, the rich literature from the field of
economics on auction models has not permeated into the legal literature.
This is especially peculiar in light of the number of law and economics
scholars writing on this topic in law reviews, and the recognition by these
scholars that auctions are being used in the market for corporate control.
The purpose of this article is to show that Delaware's forced auction
rule is harmful to shareholders because it requires directors to effectuate
changes in control through a particular sort of auction process when other
means for disposing of corporate assets may realize higher prices. Thus,
the Delaware forced open-auction makes only slightly more sense than a
state law requiring supermarkets to sell bagels by auction rather than by
affixing preset, "take them or leave them" prices to the products.
The only justification imaginable for the Delaware forced auction
rule is to mitigate the conflict of interest that exists between management
and shareholders in changes of control. Since this conflict of interest ex-
ists in the sale of corporations but not in the sale of bagels, the forced
auction rule has a surface appeal. But even this justification disappears
upon closer examination, because there are alternative methods for miti-
gating such conflicts that do not force corporate assets to be reallocated
in an in~fficient manner. Thus, while potential conflicts are particularly
acute in the context of management buyouts, this article concludes that
management should not be compelled to conduct an auction for a com-
pany being sold even in this context.
Part I of this article provides an introduction to the economics of
auction theory, and offers examples of situations in which auctions of va-
rious types are particularly appropriate or particularly inappropriate. The
purpose of part I is to show that, while conducting an auction of some
sort may be the best way to dispose of corporate assets under certain
conditions, under other conditions it clearly is not. Corporate boards of
directors-rather than courts-should be able to determine the best
3. For a discussion of Delaware decisions, see infra notes 122-41 and accompanying
text.
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method for disposing of or transferring corporate control. Part II of the
article reviews the work of the dominant contributors to the legal litera-
ture on auctions in the market for corporate control. This literature,
which has had a great influence on the shape of Delaware court decisions,
does not appear to have been influenced by the economists working in the
general field of auctions.
Part III examines the law on auctions generated by the Delaware
courts and shows that they are ignoring economic theory and forcing
management to comply with auction rules that reduce shareholder
wealth. Part IV examines the possible justifications for requiring manage-
ment to conduct an auction, and concludes that there are less intrusive
means for solving the conflicts of interest that plague the modern publicly
held firm. The phenomenon of leveraged buyouts by management is then
used to illustrate various points made in the article.
I. THE EFFICIENT DISPOSITION OF ASSETS AND THE COST OF AUCTIONS
There exists a huge array of methods for disposing of an as-
set-holding an auction is only one of them. In addition, there are many
different sorts of auctions.
Perhaps the most well known types of auctions are the English, or
ascending bid auction, in which the asset is allocated to the buyer who
makes the final and highest bid;' and the Dutch auction, in which the sale
price of a good is set at an initial, high level and then lowered until a bid
is made. ll Other types of auctions include those in which prospective pur-
chasers submit sealed bids, and so-called Vickrey auctions, in which each
potential buyer submits a bid, and the asset is allocated to the highest
bidder, but that bidder pays only the second highest priced bid.6 In addi-
tion, some auctions require all bidders to pay an initial entry fee in order
to be permitted to bid.' These auction strategies are not selected by asset
owners at random. Rather, asset owners will choose the sales technique
that is most likely to yield the highest price for the goods being sold.
For asset owners, the critical questions are: (1) under what circum-
stances is it appropriate for an asset owner to conduct an auction instead
of a privately negotiated sale; and (2) what sorts of auctions are optimal
under various circumstances? As will be seen, the principal insight of this
paper as derived directly from the economics literature of auctions, is
that different sorts of assets should be sold in different ways.
The application of this insight to the market for corporate control is
straightforward but heretofore unrecognized. While an unfettered, Eng-
lish style, come-one-come-all auction may be the optimal way to transfer
control of certain firms, for other companies, shareholders will maximize
the value of their shares by utilizing some other selling strategy. While
4. Riley & Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, 71 Ar.L ECON. REV. 381, 382 (1981).
5. [d. at 382 nA.
6. [d. at 382.
7. [d.
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this conclusion may appear obvious, the judges8 and legal scholars9 writ-
ing in this area uniformly have concluded that a single sales strategy
should control the sale of public corporations. This conclusion is clearly
wrong.
In a seminal article, Professors French and McCormick made a major
contribution to auction literature by showing that, where auction partici-
pants face sunk costs, each buyer will bid less for the asset than he thinks
it is worth in order to recover his sunk costs.IO In equilibrium, the win-
ning bidder pays a sum equal to his expected profit plus the sum of his
competitor's sunk costs.11 Asset owners therefore have a strong incentive
to devise auction rules that minimize bidders' sunk costs because these
costs are transferred from the bidders to the asset owners. Bidders' esti-
mation costsI2 are transferred from bidders to asset owners because po-
tential buyers will offer sellers less than they think an asset is worth in
order to recoup the costs they have incurred in preparing their bids.
Thus, asset owners will want to design auction systems that minimize
bidders' bid preparation costs in order to increase the amount buyers are
willing to bid.
The French and McCormick analysis may be summarized succinctly.
Firms involved in bidding for assets must incur precontract costs to esti-
mate the value of the object on which they are bidding and to prepare
their bids. As French and McCormick observe, these costs are not margi-
nal; they are sunk.I:! In order for bidding firms to survive, they must re-
cover these sunk bid preparation costs as well as their marginal costs.14
Thus, "the textbook prediction that price equals marginal cost cannot al-
ways be accurate."Ill
Based on these observations, French and McCormick developed a
model which posits two competitive equilibria, one before bidders' costs
are sunk and one after. Before costs are sunk, there are an infinite num-
ber of potential bidders, and all marginal conditions obtain, including the
expectation of zero profits to bidders. After bidders' costs are sunk, how-
ever, only a finite number of competitors exist.I8
The game changes when this finite number of competitors emerges.
Each of these bidders adjusts its bid in anticipation of the expected num-
ber of rival bidders: "Depending on the number of competitors, the firm
reduces its bid below its estimate of the asset's value to the point where
the expected cost of reducing the bid 1 more dollar equals the expected
8. For a discussion of the pertinent judicial decisions, see infra notes 122-41 and ac·
companying text.
9. For a discussion of these works, see infra notes 47-121 and accompanying text.
10. French & McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition,
57 J. Bus. 417, 424 (1984).
11. Id.
12. Estimation costs are the search costs of determining the value of the asset.
13. French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 417-18.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 438-39.
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revenue."17 In other words, as the number of bidders goes up, each bid-
der's expected profit from bidding decreases. Firms will enter or leave the
auction until the expected gains from bidding equal the expected costs.
Thus, under any given set of auction rules, bidders will recover their
prebid estimation costs by bidding an amount that reflects these costs.
Ignoring sunk costs, bids for assets will equal their present value. In the
face of sunk bidding costs, however, bids will equal the present value of
the assets being sold minus industry bid preparation costs.IS This is an
important insight for asset owners. Asset owners must expect to recover
the value of the asset "minus all the bid preparation costs, ... [since]
the estimation costs are transferred from the bidders to the asset
owner."I9
Since bidders are internalizing all of the bidders' prebid sunk costs,
they have a strong incentive to adopt auction rules that minimize those
costs. Bidders' sunk costs will be of particular concern in the market for
corporate control because of the magnitude of those costs. In the takeover
context, bidders' sunk costs include the costs of search in that market, of
compliance with the securities laws, of performing due diligence, and of
estimating the market value of the assets to be purchased. But in order
for asset owners (or their agents) to maximize the value of the asset they
are selling, they must be able to control the rules governing the sale of
such assets.
In light of the heavy sunk costs borne by bidders engaged in a con-
tested takeover, sellers and bidders are likely to prefer a sealed bid auc-
tion over an open-ended, English auction in which bidders have the
opportunity to increase their bids during the course of the auction. This
is because, unlike the situation in a sealed-bid auction where no rebidding
is allowed, bidders risk losing their sunk investments in estimation costs
in an open-ended auction. A simple example illustrates this point.
Suppose that two bidding firms, X and Y, are considering bidding on
a target firm. Before incurring any sunk estimation costs, X and Y calcu-
late that the asset is worth somewhere in the range of $70-$150. They also
predict that they will have to pay estimation costs of $20 in order to com-
ply with applicable disclosure and due diligence rules and in order to
17. [d. at 423. As the number of expected bidders increases, the expected profit of
each bidder goes down. As French and McCormick point out, this is due to two factors.
First, increasing the number of bidders decreases the probability that any particular bidder
will succeed. As a bidder's probability of success goes down, so too does its expected profit
from bidding, since expected profits will be multiplied by this probability estimate. Second,
the winner's payoff decreases as the number of bidding firms increases because each bidder
will narrow the gap between its bid and its adjusted estimate of the asset's value when the
number of bidders goes up. This is because the expected differenc~ between each bidder's
estimate of the value of the firm and the other bidders' estimate of the value of the asset
decreases as the number of bidders goes up. When this happens, bidders must increase their
bids in order to prevail in the auction. As the number of bidders increases, bidders' estima-
tion costs go up, and the returns to asset owners goes down. [d. at 423-24.
18. [d. at 417.
19. [d. at 425 (emphasis added).
HeinOnline -- 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 90 1990
90 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
make an informed bid. Further, suppose that after incurring the sunk es-
timation costs, the parties discover that the asset is worth $100.
Under these assumptions, the parties recognize that they cannot pay
more than $80 for the asset without making the auction a losing proposi-
tion once their sunk costs are taken into account. If they pay $81, they
will have invested a total of $101 ($20 in sunk estimation costs, plus $81
to purchase the asset). But once the firms have entered an open-outcry
auction, they have an incentive to bid up to the market value of the asset
($100). For example, once Firm X has bid $80, Firm Y's choices are: (1)
stop bidding and lose its $20 sunk cost; or (2) bid $81, thereby reducing
its total losses to only $19. Of course, once Firm Y has bid $81, Firm X
must either keep raising its bid, or lose its sunk estimation costs. Only
when one party has bid the full $100 will bidding finally stop.20 Rational
bidders will decline to enter auctions of this type, knowing that, unless
they collude with other bidders, they inevitably will lose money.
The implication of this analysis is clear. In certain takeover situa-
tions, it may be in the asset owner's interest to be able to restrict bidders
to only one bid in order to encourage bidders to enter the auction process.
This will be particularly true where bidders have high sunk costs. As will
be seen,21 the rules of prominent takeover commentators such as Frank
Easterbrook, Dan Fischel, and Lucian Bebchuk fail to take the problem
of prebid sunk estimation costs into account. Consequently, their policy
prescriptions for takeovers, by failing to give target firms the ability to
structure sealed bid auctions, reduce shareholder wealth.
Just as conducting a sealed bid auction will be the best way to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth in some contexts, limiting the number of bidders
will maximize shareholder wealth in other contexts. Similarly, sometimes
negotiated sales will be preferred to auctions. Any rules that deprive sell-
ing firms of the flexibility needed to craft their own auction rules will
harm shareholders.
It is also important for asset owners to be able both to control the
timing of the auction and to restrict the number of bidders. As the num-
ber of bidders increases, bidders' expected profits fall. Once a certain
number of firms are competing in an auction, "no other firm has an in-
centive to enter because its expected profit will not cover its estimation
costs. In fact, if a new firm did enter the auction, it would also drive
everyone else's expected profit below its (now sunk) estimation costs."22
Thus, uncertainty about the number of firms involved in an auction can
disrupt the plans of firms already committed to bidding and reduce the
incentive of those firms to commit to preparing bids in the first place.
This is so because risk-averse bidding firms may overestimate the number
20. A bid of $101 will cause the parties to lose one dollar more than the amount of
their sunk costs. At this point, the parties will decline to bid because not bidding will allow
them to lose only the amount of their sunk costs.
21. For a discussion of these commentators' analysis, see infra notes 50-86 and accom·
panying text.
22. French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 424.
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of firms bidding, and therefore, underestimate their own potential profits.
An interesting empirical implication emerges from this analysis. In
an efficient auction market in which the bidding firms make reasonable
assumptions about the number of competitors, the expected value of the
winning bid will increase as the number of bidders increases.23 This is
because bid preparation costs increase with the number of bidders.24
Thus, when prebid costs are taken into account, there will be a divergence
between the value of the asset and the value of the winning bid. This
divergence is not evidence of lack of competition; nor is it evidence that
bidders are obtaining economic rents or exploiting target firm sharehold-
ers. Rather, the divergence "simply reflects the fact that the winning bid-
der must, on average, recover the industry's estimation costs."25
Interestingly, however, gains to bidders in takeover contests have
been steadily declining in recent years.26 Studies show that bidders made
statistically significant gains of 4.4% in the 1960's.27 During the 1970's,
bidder returns declined to 2.2%; studies from the 1980's show that bidder
returns have turned negative.28 In light of the above analysis, it seems
likely that these declining returns to bidders are consistent with imper-
fections in the bidding process. In particular, as will be seen below, judi-
cial decisions regulating the takeover process make it increasingly difficult
for target firms to control the bidding process.29 One consequence of this
inability to control the bidding process is that bidders are unable to cap-
ture the industry's sunk bid costs. If this is the case, in the long run we
will observe bidders leaving the industry, and the remaining bidders mak-
ing fewer bids. A new equilibrium may be reached, but shareholders will
suffer as fewer bids are made for their firms.
In other words, the lack of gains to bidding firms in takeover contests
suggests that one of two phenomena is occurring. First, it is possible that
bidders are not incurring any sunk costs associated with making bids. If
this were the case, bidding firms' bids would equal the expected value of
the assets on which they are bidding. It is, however, highly unlikely that
this is the case. Bidders must incur significant costs in the form of re-
search, bid preparation, due diligence, and legal fees. These costs are all
specific to the particular auction in question.
Alternatively, it is possible that bidders are not recovering their
prebid sunk costs and the takeover market is in disequilibrium because of
target firms' inability to control the auction process for their firms. If the
industry were in equilibrium, bidders would be recovering their sunk
23. [d. at 439. See also Reece, Competitive Bidding For Offshore Petroleum Leases, 9
BELL J. ECON. 369, 383 (1978).
24. French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 439.
25. [d.
26. Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evi-
dence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49, 53 (1988).
27. [d.
28. [d.
29. For a discussion of the relevant court decisions, see infra notes 122-41 and accom-
panying text.
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costs. Additionally, anecdotal evidence that the industry is not in equilib-
rium is suggested by the fact that the vast majority of potential acquirers
refuse to enter into contested takeover contests. Realizing that they will
be unable to recover their sunk prebid estimation costs, it is common for
acquirers to insist that any acquisition they make be on a friendly basis.
Unfortunately, the costs of this phenomenon, which come in the form
of a decreased number of tender offers, are exceedingly hard to measure.
While target firms' premiums have been rising dramatically,30 there is no
way to determine how many more bids would have been made if bidders
could be more certain about whether they would be able to recover the
value of their prebid estimation costs.
But clearly constructed rules do not insure that shareholders and
their agents will get the highest price for their firm in a takeover. Once we
assume that bidders must invest resources to value target firms and to
prepare bids, it is clear that auction strategy and design will play a large
role in determining the price that shareholders are able to obtain for their
firms in the takeover context. And, the traditional auction format will not
always be the optimal method by which assets owners can dispose of their
assets. Factors to be considered will be the sources of the bidders' infor-
mation, whether the information being produced is productive or unpro-
ductive, the reputation of the seller, and above all, the nature of the
assets being sold.
Asset owners have devised a number of strategies to reduce bidders'
investment in information in order to increase their returns in an auction.
Obviously, sellers will produce information about themselves whenever
possible so that bidders will not have to do so. Asset owners also will
increase returns to themselves by actively preventing bidders from invest-
ing in search costs. Two well known examples of this phenomenon are
auctions for U.S. Treasury bills and sales of diamonds by DeBeers.31
Small purchasers of Treasury bills indicate the quantity of U.S. govern-
ment debt they wish to purchase, but are not permitted to submit price
bids. Rather, the price they pay will be the average of the accepted com-
petitive bids. This reduces the incentives of both small and large bidders
to engage in a costly search regarding price.32
DeBeers has devised an ingenious mechanism for preventing its cus-
tomers from incurring bid preparation costs. DeBeers customers submit
orders to the company specifying the number, weight, and quality of the
raw diamonds they would like. DeBeers prepares a package of diamonds
meeting these specifications (called a "sight"), and presents it to the cus-
tomer on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis. Customers who reject the sight are
30. Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra note 26, at 53.
31. See, e.g., French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 431-32; Barzel, Measurement
Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J. L. & ECON. 27, 32 (1982).
32. Small bidders have no incentive to engage in bid preparation because they are not
permitted to submit priced bids. Large bidders' incentive to conduct search is diminished by
the fact that small bidders are free riding on their investments in information. French &
McCormick, supra note 10, at 431.
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not permitted to submit orders in the future. As French and McCormick
observe, "[t]his ... arrangement virtually eliminates the acquisition of
information, save for the initial one by DeBeers themselves. Presumably
it is their longstanding reputation that warrants the quality of the infor-
mation and prevents the duplication of information."33
While the mechanisms used for selling diamonds and Treasury bills
may appear a bit exotic, they illustrate the point that sellers have incen-
tives to go to extraordinary lengths to reduce buyers' information costs.
In particular, at times it will be in the sellers' interest to reduce competi-
tion among buyers by providing them with information, limiting the num-
ber of bidders, or, in some instances, by abandoning auctions altogether
in favor of negotiated sales.
Negotiated sales, which allow buyers to avoid bid preparation costs,
will replace auctions where sellers have good reputations. In addition,
where the particular identity of the buyer has little to do with the price
offered for the goods being sold, negotiated sales are likely to replace auc-
tions. Where different buyers are likely to place the same value on the
asset, the identity of the buyer will not affect price, and the cost of hold-
ing an auction can be avoided. But where there is a dispersion in the
value that buyers place on the asset, either because they have differing
amounts of information about the asset, or because the subjective value
of the asset varies with the identity of the buyer, then a negotiated sale is
unlikely.34
The problems associated with auctions for oil, gas, and mineral rights
have been closely studied by economists and appear to be quite similar to
the problems faced by bidders in an acquisition for a publicly held corpo-
ration. The sale price of the minerals (or the target firm) will depend on
the bidders' estimation of the future value of the assets.35 While the value
of the firm may be the same to all bidders in a world of perfect informa-
tion, given that bidders will have different estimates of the market value
of the asset, the bidders are likely to have different bid prices.36 Sellers
have an obvious incentive to avoid wasteful duplication in the production
of information by bidders. To avoid this duplication, sellers will attempt
to lower bidders' bid preparation costs by supplying them with informa-
tion.37 But, as Ronald Johnson has shown in an important article on bid
preparation costs in auctions, even with the advised provision of data to
bidders by the seller, each bidder can be expected to undertake an ex-
pense to determine the cost of altering the asset to his own needs, as well
as the costs associated with interpreting and verifying the data supplied
33. Id. at 432.
34. Id. In particular, negotiatiWls with buyers are likely to be preferred to auctions
where, "there is not much dispersion in the true value of the asset across the potential
buyers, ... (or if the owner can determine the highest valued user ex ante)."
35. Milgrom & Weber, supra note 1, at 1093-94.
36. Id.
37. Hughart, Informational Asymmetry, Bidding Strategies, and the Marketing of
Offshore Petroleum Leases, 83 J. POL. ECON. 969 (1975).
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by the seller.3s
In oil exploration, the bidders' costs will take the form of estimating
the cost of developing the site for drilling and interpreting the relevant
geological survey evidence.39 In the market for corporate control, the costs
will be associated with developing a strategic plan for redeploying the tar-
get firm's strategic assets, negotiating the necessary financing arrange-
ments, preparing a bid package in compliance with the relevant securities
laws, and conducting a due diligence investigation of the seller (all of
which include the expense of paying lawyers, accountants, and invest-
ment bankers). These costs are far from trivial.
Thus, the economic and social gains accruing from exploitation of the
resource (or the acquisition of the target firm) can be dissipated by the
costs of bid development;fO Nevertheless, as Johnson observes:
[t]he expenditure undertaken to determine the cost of exploitation [of a
target firm, for example] does have social value as it aids in establishing
the highest user value via the bidding process. This gain, however, is
offset by the resources involved in each bidder determining an estimate
of development costs . . . . The major conclusion is that an entrance
fee or charge can reduce the amount dissipated and provide an increase
in net returns to the seller.n
Based on these observations, under certain conditions, sellers will
:find it in their best interests to impose entry fees in order to restrict the
number of bidders. In particular, where the aggregate savings to bidders
in the form of reduced estimation costs is greater than the expected in-
crease in price from adding additional bidders, we will expect sellers to
restrict entry. Thus, even though the imposition of an entry fee will dis-
courage entry into bidding, "an entrance fee or charge can reduce the
amount dissipated and provide an increase in net returns to the seller."42
By reducing the total costs associated with the bidding process, the in-
crease in net returns to the seller brought about by restricting bidding
through entry fees is not only consistent with a strategy of private wealth
maximization, but the policy of maximization of social welfare as well.
Thus, absent legal impediments to the contrary, we might expect sellers
to impose restrictions on the number of bidders in the form of entry fees
where bid preparation costs are high.
Interestingly, the merger and acquisition departments of major
United States investment banks do not require bid preparation fees. This
is particularly surprising in light of the similarities between auctions for
firms and government auctions for oil leases, where it seems clear that bid
preparation fees are desirable. Both situations often involve the receipt of
38. Johnson, Auction Markets, Bid Preparation Costs and Entrance Fees, 55 LAND
ECONS. 313 (1979).
39. Id.
40. Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to In-
ventive Activity, 61 AMER. ECON. REV. 561 (1971).
41. Johnson, supra note 38, at 314.
42. Id. See also Hughart, supra note 37 (discussing over-investment problem).
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information about the target firm by potential bidders, which is analo-
gous to the survey information given to bidders for oil leases. After re-
ceipt of the information, however, bidders for corporations-like bidders
for oil leases-are expected to engage in a costly process of ascertaining
the value of the assets of the firm to be acquired, including the prepara-
tion of legal documents and the conduct of due diligence. It would seem
that having prospective bidders submit entry fees in order to be able to
bid would be desirable.
One possible explanation for the absence of entry fees is that target
firms' investment bankers are able to narrow down the number of poten-
tial bidders ex ante in ways that accomplish the same result as bid prepa-
ration fees. For example, investment bankers often require potential
bidders to submit preliminary indications of interest in a target firm.
These preliminary indications of interest reflect bidders' first approxima-
tions of their estimates of the value of the target. Only the top bidders on
their list are permitted to go forward with the costly process of preparing
legal documents and conducting the due diligence necessary to submit a
final bid. These preliminary indications of interest serve as a direct sub-
stitute for the entry fees required in oil exploration bidding by reducing
bidders' investment in search.
An additional reason why corporations being auctioned do not re-
quire bidders to submit entrance fees is that these sellers have far less
control over the conduct of the auction process than the sellers of other
assets. In particular, selling firms often cannot control the timing of the
start of an auction, since it may be triggered by a buyer's public an-
nouncement of a tender offer for a controlling interest in the target firm.
The sellers are the firm's widely dispersed public shareholders. In such
situations, the target firm itself is simply unable to control the bidding
process sufficiently to be able to impose an entrance fee on potential bid-
ders. And courts, which are mesmerized by the conflict of interest prob-
lem presented by entrenched incumbent management rejecting good bids
in order to retain control, are likely to look askance on any attempt by
target firm management to impose an entrance fee on potential bidders.
A final factor militating against the imposition of entry fees is that,
unlike the situation with oil leases, the value of a target firm is productive
in the sense that the actual value of the target firm may be affected by
the information obtained by the bidder. In such cases, entry fees are in-
appropriate because the fees discourage the production of information
that can increase the price that bidders are willing to offer to sellers.43
Thus, for example, where different bidding firms are likely to value a tar-
get firm differently, encouraging bidder search by declining to impose en-
try fees "may improve the allocation of the asset so that the highest
valued user receives it."" Similarly, increasing the number of bidders in-
creases the probability that some bidder will find a particularly efficient
43. French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 426.
44. ld. at 428.
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plan for using the asset.~l> As French and McCormick have observed:
The value of products which are complicated or unique, such as
rare art objects, may vary considerably across bidders. In this case, in-
creasing [the number of bidders] increases the probability that a user
for whom the true value of the asset is particularly high will bear the
cost of preparing and submitting a bid. When the asset is simple or its
value is easily estimated, the seller stands to gain little from having
many buyers invest in information. This allows us to make some pre-
dictions about the type of auctions which are likely to have entry fees.
For example, ongoing auctions, where the product is standardized and
the seller has a well-established brand name, are likely candidates for
[entry] fees. In this case, the cost of information acquired by prospec-
tive buyers is borne by the seller with little concomitant gain in reve-
nues. On the other hand, auctions for unusual products are less likely to
involve entry fees. By this reasoning, estate or land auctions are not
likely to impose a fee for bidding.~6
Target firms are complicated, unique and unusual products; conse-
quently, it is not surprising that we do not observe sellers charging entry
fees to prospective bidders. On the other hand, investment bankers, as
agents for selling firms, often will employ strategies such as requiring pro-
spective purchasers to submit preliminary, nonbinding indications of in-
terest as a method of winnowing down the field of prospective bidders in
order to reduce aggregate bid preparation costs.
The following section applies these theoretical insights about the
conduct of auctions to existing literature on the market for corporate con-
trol. As will be seen, there is a wide gulf between these insights and cur-
rently fashionable policy prescriptions.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE
The seminal article on the issue of auctions in the market for corpo-
rate control argues for a rule that would prohibit management of a public
corporation from organizing an auction for the firm in the event of a bid
for control.~7 Their preferred legal regime would require officers and di-
rectors to remain passive in the face of a tender offer.~8 Professor Lucian
Bebchuk has devoted considerable time to refuting Easterbrook and Fis-
chel's arguments. The debate has been joined by other important com-
mentators, notably Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz.49
45. ld.
46. ld. at 429-30.
47. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management In Respond-
ing to A Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
48. ld. at 1164, 1201-04.
49. For a discussion of these commentators' works, see infra notes 87-121 and accom-
panying text.
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A. Easterbrook & Fischel's Passivity Rule
Easterbrook and Fischel provide two reasons why auctions are incon-
sistent with the goal of shareholder wealth maximization. First, they ar-
gue that subsequent bidders who follow on the coattails of the initial
bidder are free-riding on the information generated by the first bidder.150
Because it is costly to locate undervalued target firms and to prepare bids
for them, potential bidders will steer clear of the bidding process if they
think that other firms can steal the information they have generated
through costly search simply by observing their actions. Because subse-
quent bidders have incurred no costs to acquire information, they can
offer a higher price to target-firm shareholders, forcing the initial bidder
to increase his offer or else lose the opportunity to acquire the target firm.
The second problem with auctions that Easterbrook and Fischel
identify involves the consumption of real resources on the part of the firm
being acquired.151 Resisting takeovers consumes resources in the form of
wasted managerial time, legal fees, court costs, etc. Bidders, according to
Easterbrook and Fischel, would be willing to pay more to acquire assets if
they did not have to incur resistance costs, which ultimately reduce the
value of the target. Consequently, in the absence of resistance, more bids
would be made.
The problem with the Easterbrook and Fischel argument is that it
focuses exclusively on the costs involved in holding auctions and ignores
the benefits of the procedure. In particular, the auction literature indi-
cates that, while having an auction may reduce the number of bidders, it
may increase the amount that the winning bidder is willing to pay.152
Easterbrook and Fischel's conclusions are strongly motivated by their
prior assumptions about the nature of the market for corporate control.
They view the market for corporate control primarily as an arena in
which market forces monitor and discipline incumbent managers of target
firms.153 These managers have an incentive to shirk their duties and con-
sume a disproportionate share of corporate resources because -widely dis-
persed shareholders are incapable of monitoring their activities at
reasonable cost.54 Outside bidders can achieve arbitrage profits by locat-
ing and buying controlling interests in poorly managed target firms in
order to displace the old, inefficient management with a more productive
group.55
From the standpoint of auction theory, the problem with Easter-
brook and Fischel's analysis is that it ignores the fact that in certain take-
50. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 47, at 1178-79.
51. ld. at 1175.
52. E.g., Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to
Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987).
53. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 47, at 1169-73.
54. See Hensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
55. For a more complete discussion and refutation of Easterbrook and Fischel's argue-
ments, see Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 52.
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over situations there are likely to be particular bidders who value control
of the target more highly than others. It also ignores the fact that subse-
quent resales to such rights valuing bidders will be costly, and that there
are ways that targets can compensate bidders for their search costs. For
example, where a firm is quite unusual in terms of the products or ser-
vices it provides, or where corporate control carries with it certain subjec-
tive pleasures (as in the case of a professional sports team), open auctions
are likely to be preferred by potential bidders because the seller will not
be able to ascertain the identity of these potential purchasers.56 Similarly,
auction literature suggests that where bidders' costs are nonduplicative,
in the sense that the information that one bidder finds to be useful is
different from information another bidder may find useful, asset owners
will find it in their interest to conduct an auction.
To simplify somewhat, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that auctions
are undesirable in the contests for corporate control because they cause
initial bidders to lose the sunk costs in information that they have in-
curred.57 But, as French and McCormick show, the mere presence of sunk
costs does not preclude the desirability of holding auctions under certain
circumstances.58 In particular, in situations where subsequent bidders ac-
tually generate new information, where buyers may have information
about the target that is not available to sellers, where different buyers
place different values on the assets, and where bid preparation costs are
low, it will be to the advantage of sellers to conduct an auction.
The point here is not to suggest that Easterbrook and Fischel are
wrong in pointing to the existence of sunk costs for target firm shares.
Their identification of the presence of such costs is a major contribution
to the literature on corporate control. Similarly, I wish to emphasize that
I am not arguing that auctions for target shares ought to be required.
Rather, the point is that every takeover situation is different. And, while
Easterbrook and Fischel are correct to point to the existence of sunk
costs as representing an important cost of using auctions in the market
for corporate control, they are wrong to suppose that the benefits of using
auctions never outweigh these costs.
B. Bebchuk's Response
In an interesting article responding to Easterbrook and Fischel, Pro-
fessor Lucian Bebchuk advanced a rule of auctioneering that would re-
quire that auctions be held open sufficiently long to allow time for rival
bidders to make competing bids.59 Bebchuk's approach also allows the
56. French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 430.
57. This succinct formulation of Easterbrook & Fischel's argument may be found in
Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 51 (1982).
58. For a discussion of French & McCormick's views on this point, see supra notes 13-
25 and accompanying text.
59. Bebchuk, The Case For Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1028, 1030 (1982).
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officers and directors of the target firm to solicit these rival bids by pro-
viding information about the target to potential bidders.6o Bebchuk noted
that, while the expectation of arbitrage profits from increasing managerial
productivity "may explain some or even many takeovers, there is no basis
for denying the significance of other motives."61 In particular, synergistic
gains from a number of sources, including economies of scale in produc-
tion, marketing, and capital costs may account for the gains from a take-
over.62 Other synergistic gains will arise if the acquirer has "skills or
nonpatentable information that are useful to the target. Finally, the take-
over may yield tax savings or an increase in ... market power."63
In addition to synergistic gains, Bebchuk argued that a firm might
also be motivated to make an acquisition if the target's stock were under-
valued in the market. In such cases, "the takeover does not increase the
target's true value; it only makes the market aware of an already existing
value."64 Lastly, on the theory that bidding firms, as well as target firms,
suffer from the costs associated with the separation of ownership and
management, Bebchuk argued that bidding firm managers might make
acquisitions simply to expand the size of the enterprise under their
contro1.65
Bebchuk concedes that Easterbrook and Fischel are correct in their
observation that auctions will "have some adverse effect on the amount of
search done by prospective offerors."66 These offerors will refrain from
searching for potential targets since they cannot always recoup the costs
associated with this activity unless they are successful in acquiring the
target firm. Since auctions reduce the probability of success in acquiring
the target, search is reduced.
Bebchuk notes, however, that bidders can recoup their search costs
in some instances even if they are unsuccessful in acquiring the target.
First, he argues, potential bidders can invest in the target's stock, and
later resell it to the ultimate purchaser at a healthy premium.67 While
Bebchuk's point is true as far as it goes, the argument ignores certain
basic principles of economics, and is wrong as a matter of social policy.
The question is not whether initial bidders who are unsuccessful can re-
sell the stock they have acquired to the successful bidder; rather, the is-
sue is whether the gains to bidders from these resales are greater than the
gains from a successful acquisition. Clearly they are not. Indeed, Bebchuk
does not even suggest that they might be. Consequently, a potential bid-
der who wants to acquire control of a target is worse off if he must sell
out to a subsequent bidder. Any gains from the sale only mitigate his
60. [d.
61. [d. at 1031.
62. [d.
63. [d. at 1031-32.
64. [d. at 1033.
65. [d.
66. [d. at 1035.
67. [d.
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damages; they do not eliminate them. Thus, Bebchuk's response does not
refute the fundamental economic logic behind Easterbrook and Fischel's
point: Auctions reduce the gains to bidders and hence the incidence of
bids.
Second, Bebchuk argues that "a searcher may discover a target
whose acquisition will bring greater synergistic or managerial gains to the
searcher than to any other potential acquirers."66 Bebchuk argues that
these searchers will acquire the target firms for which they bid regardless
of when they appear in the bidding process.69 But Bebchuk's analysis ig-
nores the process by which bidders obtain the information about the syn-
ergistic gains associated with a particular acquisition. If a bidder only
obtains this information by free-riding on the search of others; then
Bebchuk's argument crumbles once we recognize that initial bidders will
not engage in search if the only consequence of the search will be to sig-
nal other firms that they can enjoy synergistic gains by acquiring the tar-
get. In other words, here Bebchuk's analysis assumes the existence of an
initial bidder whose search supplies subsequent auction participants with
information about the value of the target. His analysis is flawed because
it deprives these initial bidders of any incentive to provide this service.'1o
Next, Professor Bebchuk argues that search costs are not particularly
high.'1l He offers no evidence for this assertion, other than the unique
suggestion that investment bankers conduct much of the search for pro-
spective targets, and charge low fees for this service.'12
As the discussion of the auction literature in part I illustrates, Pro-
fessor Bebchuk is on no firmer ground when he shifts his analysis from
bidders' incentives to premiums for target firm shareholders. He asserts
that "[c]ompetition among potential bidders generally raises the price a
seller will receive."'13 The economists who have studied auctions have
demonstrated that this is not always the case. As discussed in part I, for
certain types of assets, reducing the competition among bidders will raise
the price the seller will receive. In particular, as McCormick and French
show, asset owners must always "pay all of the potential buyers' precon-
tract costs."'14 For this reason, we observe owners imposing entry fees on
68. Id. at 1036.
69. Id.
70. Professor Bebchuk also argues that bidders can obtain suitable rewards for search
without abandoning the auction process by raising the percentage of target firm stock that
bidders can purchase without disclosure. Id. at 1038. This argument suffers from the same
flaw as the argument addressed in the text, namely that it ignores the economics of behavior
at the margin. The issue is not whether bidders can obtain "suitable awards" for their
search, but whether the incremental gains from a particular search will outweigh the cost.
Bebchuk has conceded that requiring auctions will result in higher costs to bidders. Id. at
1035. Having done so, he cannot then argue that these higher costs will have no
consequences.
71. Id. at 1036-37.
72. Ct. Gilson, supra note 57, at.58 n.17 (noting "seemingly very high fees charged by
merger and acquisition departments of investment banking firms").
73. Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1041.
74. French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 425.
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potential bidders in order to restrict the number of bidders, where such
bidders must incur high search and information costs (estimation' costs)
in connection with their bids. As the estimation costs go up, it becomes
more and more desirable for asset owners to reduce the estimation costs
they charge for their firms. Suppose, for example, that it is costly to esti-
mate the value of a firm, but that the value of the firm, once determined,
is unlikely to vary much from bidder to bidder. In such cases, sellers have
"little to gain from having many buyers invest in information."7l> This is a
straightforward application of the principle that sellers have an incentive
to reduce bidders' costs. Where a buyer can identify the highest-valued
user, or where the dispersion in the value of the asset across potential
buyers is small, then, absent legal constraints, asset owners will avoid the
use of an auction.76 In such situations, a negotiated sale to a single bidder
will maximize the returns to the selIer.77
Ignoring the economics literature on auctions, Bebchuk asserts that
auctions would benefit sellers "in all acquisitions, unfriendly or negoti-
ated, through merger or takeover, whether management is loyal or self-
serving."78 This is as absurd as declaring that all grocery store owners
should conduct auctions for fruits and vegetables in order to maximize
their profits.
For example, Bebchuk recognizes that some takeovers occur because
of the possibility of tax savings. These tax savings may be equally availa-
ble to many firms. There is no reason to conduct an open auction where
this is the case; adding more bidders will not increase the price being
offered, since there is no dispersion of values among bidders. Adding bid-
ders will only reduce the amount of the winning bid by the estimated
amount of the bidders' sunk costs.
Bebchuk argues that, while forcing firms to conduct auctions reduces
the incentives for search by bidders, it encourages search by target man-
agement,79 This will be true in some cases, but not all. Some target firms
may be equally valuable to a wide range of potential bidders. Where this
is the case, there is no reason for targets to engage in costly search.
In other words, Bebchuk's error is that he only identifies one cost of
auctions: "The only possible objection to a rule of auctioneering is that it
reduces the number of acquisitions by decreasing the incentives for
search."80 But an additional objection to a rule of auctioneering exists;
namely, it involves the waste of real resources.81 The economics literature
on auctions discussed in the article shows that for certain types of target
firms this waste can be avoided by not holding an auction.
Ironically, Bebchuk appears to recognize the point first made by
75. ld. at 430.
76. ld. at 432-33.
77. ld.
78. Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1045.
79. ld. at 1045-46.
80. ld. at 1046.
81. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 47, at 1174-75.
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Yoram. Barzel that one pitfall associated with the market for corporate
control is the danger that excessive resources will be expended on
search.S2 But he erroneously concludes that this pitfall can be avoided by
holding unlimited auctions.S3 In fact, the auction literature shows that in
many situations it will be possible to avoid the waste of excessive re-
sources only by restricting the number of bidders.s,
Finally, Professor Bebchuk's principal policy prescription is to im-
pose a mandatory delay period.slI The problem with Bebchuk's analysis is
that it ignores the fact that a mandatory delay period allows bidders to
rebid. As noted in section I, this will be disastrous both to bidders and to
asset owners in any acquisition in which bidders must incur sunk costs.so
This is because bidders will decline to enter a bidding contest unless they
can be assured that they can recover these sunk costs. While bidders can
recover sunk costs in sealed bid auctions, in open-bidding situations of
the kind Bebchuk proposes, once bidding is underway, bidders will have
an incentive to ignore their sunk costs and bid up to the market value for
the firm being auctioned. Since they lose money doing this, they will be
discouraged from entering a bidding situation that will lead them into
this trap.
C. Additions and Extensions to the Literature
In addition to the articles by Bebchuk and by Easterbrook and Fis-
chel, other commentators, particularly Ron Gilson and Alan Schwartz,
have contributed seminal articles to the theoretical literature on the ideal
corporate auction rule.
In an article that appeared contemporaneously with Bebchuk's,s7
Professor Ronald Gilson also argued that a first bidder could recoup sunk
estimation costs by buying a block of stock in the target that could be
sold at a profit to subsequent bidders.ss In addition, he stressed the point
that any societal losses resulting from the fact that bidders are unable to
recoup their sunk estimation costs will be offset by the fact that target
assets are being allocated to their most efficient users.S9 In a later article,
Professor Gilson argued that competitive bidding might actually increase
bidders' return on their investment in search costs due to increased prof-
its in subsequent sales.90
Gilson's argument is based on the observation that a successful ac-
82. Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1045.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEG. STUD. 197, 221
(1988).
86. For a discussion of the effects of rebidding, see supra notes 20-21 and accompany-
ing text.
87. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tac-
tics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
88. Id. at 870.
89. Id. at 872.
90. Gilson, supra note 57, at 66.
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quisition requires two distinct attributes: (1) information production
about the target, and (2) the actual skills necessary to operate the tar-
get.91 From this observation, Gilson concludes that those firms who pro-
duce information will "prefer a rule allowing target management to
facilitate competitive bidding, since competitive bidding would increase
the return on their investment in information."92 He also argues that
those with the skills necessary to operate the target ("implementers") will
prefer a rule of pure passivity, since a passivity rule will reduce takeover
prices and enable implementers to capture some of the returns associated
with information production.93
Professor Gilson makes an important contribution to takeover litera-
ture by recognizing that not all bidding firms involved in the takeover
game have identical skills. Some bidders may prefer auctions, while
others will prefer negotiated sales. But Gilson's argument that those firms
who are best at producing information about targets will inevitably prefer
auctions is unconvincing. As Easterbrook and Fischel point out in defense
of their no auction rule, an information producer often will benefit most
by acquiring the firm about which it has developed the information and
then reselling it later to a higher bidder.94
Similarly, it is not clear that "implementers," those best able to im-
plement the plans of the information producers, will uniformly prefer a
rule of pure passivity. It seems clear that the implementers will prefer
whatever rule the information producers prefer. After all, it does no good
for a firm to have good management skills unless it has a target firm on
which to implement them. Any rule that discourages information gather-
ers will therefore harm implementers as well.9G
Professor Gilson's analysis is valuable because it recognizes the con-
tracting problems that exist between the various institutions involved in
the market for corporate control, and because he recognizes that there are
gains to be had from specializing in the different aspects of the takeover
process. In particular, he observes that firms who acquire information
about a target, but are unable to actually run the target firm, may have
contracting problems in trying to sell the information due to the difficul-
ties of obtaining a defensible property right in information.96
Based on these observations, Professor Gilson concludes that a rule
that would prohibit defensive tactics but allow management to solicit
competitive bids would be the optimal mechanism for disposing of
91. ld. at 54.
92. ld.
93. ld. at 55.
94. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L.
REV. I, 20 (1982).
95. ld. at 18.
96. It is hard to understand the difference between Professor Gilson's information pro-
ducer and the average market professionals who routinely acquire information about under-
valued firms and recoup their investments in information by buying shares. See Gilson &
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 571 (1984).
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firms.97 His policy prescription is based on the conclusion that his pro-
posed rule would best balance the conflicting interests of information ac-
quirers and implementers. Unfortunately, like Professor Bebchuk and
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, Professor Gilson's analysis ignores
the fact that firms-both bidders and targets-differ dramatically from
one to the other. As such, no single rule will be best for all firms, and
sometimes defensive tactics will benefit target shareholders precisely be-
cause they encourage auctions.
Auction theory makes it clear that all information producers are not
going to prefer auctions to negotiations in every case. Some information
producers have sufficient reputational capital that their reputation serves
to bond the veracity of their information. In other words, the diminution
in reputational value from lying about the nature of their information is
likely to outweigh any gains from a one-shot fraud. Professor Gilson rec-
ognizes this.98 Where this is the case, the costs to the seller of negotiating
are greatly reduced. The auction process, which permits buyers to verify
the information about the target, is unnecessary where the buyers trust
the seller.99
If all potential bidders have to expend resources in bid preparation,
the information seller may lose by having an auction since the money
spent to prepare bids will be subtracted from the amount that imple-
menters are willing to bid. And, if Professor Gilson's dichotomy is correct,
and implementers are not very good at information production and as-
similation, it is likely that they will have to spend considerable resources
preparing a bid. As French and McCormick point out, the paradigm case
for negotiating instead of auctioning is where a seller with a long-standing
reputation can prevent potential buyers from collecting information by
supplying them with all of the information they need.loo DeBeers refuses
to offer its diamonds for sale at auction because it has a long-standing
reputation in the trade. Negotiating, rather than auctioning, allows the
company to obtain higher prices for its diamonds because bidders do not
subtract their sunk estimation costs from their bids.lol
In sum, it appears clear that Gilson's general rule prohibiting defen-
sive tactics will disadvantage shareholders by preventing target firms
from choosing to dispose of their firms in a negotiated sale. In this regard,
97. Gilson, supra note 57, at 64.
98. Id. at 58.
99. Id. at 58-59.
100. French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 431-33.
101. Interestingly, Professor Gilson is aware of the DeBeers method of selling
diamonds as a response to problems of collecting information. He even quotes Professor
Banel's observation that DeBeers employs its unique sales mechanism in order to place
buyers "in a position to spend on the actual purchase of diamonds the amount they other-
wise might have spent on collecting information." See Gilson, supra note 57, at 58 n.t5
(quoting Barzel, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs, 20 J. L. &
ECON. 291, 304 (1977). He fails to see, however, that these insights suggest that auctions are
inappropriate in circumstances that seem quite similar to those he is describing in the mar·
ket for corporate control.
HeinOnline -- 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 105 1990
1990] AUCTION THEORY 105
Gilson's proposed rule is no different from the other proposed rules previ-
ously described. It is too rigid for the complex world it seeks to regulate.
Professor Alan Schwartz also made an important contribution to the
literature on takeover auctions.lo2 He argues that minimum offer periods
such as those contained in the Williams Act, along with other rules re-
quiring auctions, reduce the incidence of search for welfare increasing ac-
quisitions, without producing any countervailing benefits.loa It seeins that
a complete answer to this assertion has been made in the economics liter-
ature and echoed by Professor Bebchuk.lo4 In particular, if auctions are
rendered impermissible, there may be socially excessive incentives to
search.lo5 As Haddock, Macey and McChesney explained in an earlier
article:
The search for undervalued targets, like the search for new ideas, is
costly. When several different claimants to a profitable idea or asset
emerge, some scheme for allocating the property right must also emerge
[E]stablishing property rights by first possession ordinarily results
in premature capture. Moving resources to higher-valued uses as fast as
possible is undesirable . . . .
The search for targets consumes resources which have valuable al-
ternative uses. Resources will be diverted too soon if title to the entire
increase in a corporation's value arising from reallocating control can be
established only by racing to the firm before a competitor reaches it.
Well-defined property rights control the race by forcing contenders to
deal with an owner or agent capable of implementing an internally con-
sistent plan of action. . . . Facing no resistance, first bidders would be
more likely to be the only bidders, since no defense could be used to
elicit competing bids.loO
Thus, Professor Schwartz erroneously presumes that additional in-
crements of search will be made at zero cost to searchers. This is false. An
additional problem with Schwartz's analysis is that it ignores the ability
of target firms to save on bidders' aggregate search costs by conducting
search themselves. Sometimes there are only a few potential buyers for
target firms. As George Stigler has observed, in such thin markets, "sell-
ers can also engage in search ... in the literal fashion that buyers do."lo7
102. Schwartz, Search Theory & the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 229
(1986).
103. See id. at 230.
104. Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STATS. 348 (1969);
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1047
(1982); Dasgupta & Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and the Speed of R&D, 11
BELL J. ECON. 1 (1980); Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and
Related Games, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 968 (1982).
105. Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1047.
106. Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 52, at 717-19.
107. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 216 (1961). See also
Bebchuk, The Case For Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1049
(1982); Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Take-
overs, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1776 (1985); Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights
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Similarly, as the auction literature emphasizes, where search and bid
preparation costs are low, conducting an auction will not be very costly
for target firms, and will be the sales strategy most likely to fetch the
highest price for the sellers. This is because bidders will be bidding close
to their estimate of the true value of the asset being sold, since they will
have few estimation costs to deduct.lOS
A final reason why Professor Schwartz's pro-auction rule seems de-
batable is that it can dampen productivity and skew incentives in the
internal management of target firms. Suppose that a firm's shares are
trading at $50 per share. The firm has made a discovery of a huge store of
minerals beneath some land in the West. The firm has not disclosed its
discovery because it has not yet obtained mineral rights to all of the land
in question. A rule that prohibits defensive tactics by the target would
make the company prey to a takeover the moment rumors of the mineral
discovery leaked out. This would prevent the firm's shareholders from ob-
taining the benefit of their firm's initial discovery, and dampen their in-
centives to search in the first place.
More recently, Professor Schwartz has defended a pure passivity rule
from the perspective of utilitarian theory.lo9 Like Professors Easterbrook
and Fischel, Schwartz argues that any offer above the target's prebid offer
price should be accepted, and therefore target managers should remain
passive (i.e. refuse to hold an auction or engage in defensive tactics) when
an outside bid is made for their firm.110
Professor Schwartz claims that the efficiency question in takeovers is
"whether a transfer has moved assets from a lower- to a higher-valuing
user."lll Professor Schwartz points out that there is no "aesthetic, senti-
mental or other noneconomic value" associated with stock ownership, and
that, in efficient markets, "the prebid price of a target's shares reflects the
target's earnings prospects under current management."1l2 These attrib-
utes cause stock to represent "financial assets, whose values largely are
reflected in their market price."l13 Consequently, "any transfer of corpo-
rate assets at a nontrivial premium above the market price is efficient ex
ante, in the same sense that any voluntary contract is efficient ex ante
(i.e. in the sense that the transaction makes both parties better off than
they were before)."1l4
Professor Schwartz's analysis does not appear to be confined to take-
overs. His arguments would appear to apply with equal force to any asset
that trades in a thick market to which owners attach no sentimental
value. Under Professor Schwartz's analysis, such asset owners should
in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 709-10 (1987).
108. See French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 438-40.
109. Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 165 (1988).
110. Id. at 168-69.
111. Id. at 186.
112. Id. at 188-89.
113. Id. at 170.
114. Id. (emphasis in original).
HeinOnline -- 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 107 1990
AUCTION THEORY 107
never be able to decline to sell their assets to anyone who wants to buy
them for a nontrivial premium above their current market price.
Professor Schwartz's arguments about the implications of market ef-'
ficiency do not support his conclusions. Market prices of publicly traded
shares reflect all publicly available information about those shares. Thus,
share prices at any given time reflect the market's best guess about the
future earnings of a particular firm. But some investors, particularly mar-
ket professionals, will value share ownership in a particular firm more
highly than other investors because they believe that the market price is
inaccurate. By buying these shares, such market professionals can capital-
ize on new information they have uncovered and on the implications of
their analysis of the firm whose shares are being traded. Competition
among these market professionals is what drives securities prices to their
efficient levels. Professor Schwartz's analysis would deprive these market
professionals of incentives to locate undervalued firms, since they would
be unable to capitalize fully on their investments in search.l15
Put another way, the supply curve for shares is not perfectly inelas-
tic, as Professor Schwartz presumes. Some investors believe that the mar-
ket's price evaluation is wrong, and that their shares are worth
considerably more than the price that the market has assigned. These
investors will be the highest valuing users for a firm's shares. Professor
Schwartz's proposed passivity standard would be inefficient because it
would deprive these people of the incentive to engage in search.
The peculiar thing about the current legal literature on takeovers is
that its policy prescriptions are so inflexible. Easterbrook, Fischel, and
Schwartz argue that pure passivity ought to be the governing principle.1l6
Bebchuk and Gilson argue that defensive tactics ought to be forbidden.
But even cursory reference to the literature specifically devoted to the
economics of auctions shows that neither side can be right. If target firms
differ from one another, or if bidder firms differ from one another, then
some are likely to flourish under a rule of pure passivity, some under a
rule encouraging auctions, and some under some intermediate sales strat-
egies. To conclude that all firms should be constrained by one sales strat-
egy will force some shareholders to transfer ownership of their firms in
suboptimal ways. This will depress share values generally, and provide a
disincentive to investment.
For example, suppose that a publicly traded firm wishes to be ac-
quired. It is involved in a highly specialized, high-tech industry which
requires a heavy research and development budget and can only be man-
aged by highly specialized acquirers. It has recently made a valuable dis-
covery and wishes to merge with a partner who has both able technical
skills to manage the ongoing operations of the firm and the marketing
115. Bebchuk, supra note 85, at 205-16.
116. In fact, Alan Schwartz does not specifically address the issue of whether the state
should permit shareholders of particular companies to adopt pure passivity by amendment
to their firms' charter or bylaws. He treats that issue as a "separate question" which is
"beyond the scope" of his analysis. Schwartz, supra note 109, at 169 n.13.
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skills to exploit the new product successfully. Suppose further that for
potential acquirers to make a bid they must make a sizable, non-transfer-
able investment in firm-specific information about the target firm. If an
open auction is conducted, and sale of the firm is thrown open to all com-
ers, the price that the seller receives will be reduced by the aggregate
sunk prebid costs of the bidders. To the extent that these bidders have
duplicated efforts investigating the target, requiring an auction will sim-
ply waste bidder resources and result in a net lower price for selling
shareholders.ll7
On the other hand, suppose there is another firm that makes a stan-
dardized product in a traditional way and could be managed by any num-
ber of acquiring firms using generic management skills. Suppose further
that the company is quite simple in terms of its organizational and opera-
tional form so that prebid estimation costs are low. In such cases, holding
open auctions is likely to be the optimal method of selling the firm.us
These examples are only meant to be illustrative. In the real world,
firms are far too complex to support such sweeping generalizations. The
high-tech firm might prefer to introduce some elements of an auction to
draw an acquirer who values the target more than any other buyer be-
cause of some particular insight or skill he brings to bear in managing the
target's assets.ll9 Similarly, the simple, generic firm might be better off
with a negotiated sale rather than an acquisition if it turns out that po-
tential buyers are unexpectedly investing large amounts of resources col-
lecting information about the target in the mistaken belief that there is
more to the target than meets the eye. Under these circumstances, a ne-
gotiated sale can save these estimation costs and result in a higher price
for selling shareholders.12o
Again, the point here is that a general rule favoring or disfavoring
auctions is likely to be harmful to large groups of shareholders. Two other
points need to be made. First,- current literature suggests that sellers of
assets have only two choices, auction or forced sale. The reality, as the
auction literature shows, is that there exists a huge array of sales tech-
niques. There are dozens of types of auctions and a multitude of different
mechanisms available to handle the negotiations for a particular firm.
Each of these different sales techniques may be optimal for certain firms,
but disastrous for others. Thus, it is not particularly illuminating to speak
in vague terms about requiring "auctions" unless one specifies in some
detail the particular sort of auction one favors.
A second related point concerns innovation by sellers. Since bidders'
costs are passed along to asset owners in the form of lower bids, asset
owners have an incentive to invest in developing innovative techniques to
sell their assets. Asset owners have developed a variety of ingenious auc-
tion mechanisms to respond to the particular problems facing bidders for
117. This analysis is an application of French and McCormick's theory.
118. [d.
119. [d. at 428.
120. [d. at 422-23.
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their goods. These sales techniques involve everything from imposing
submission fees on potential bidders to refusing to negotiate with some
purchasers at all. The common feature of this wealth of disparate sales
strategies is that each of them maximizes the value of the particular type
of asset being sold. To dictate by uniform rule the type of sales process
that can be used by asset owners would needlessly stifle this innovation
process.
As we will see, many of these same criticisms apply to the dominant
state and federal law on auctions. State law, as reflected in the recent
decisions of the Delaware judiciary, appears to require auctions by target
firm shareholders at least in certain contexts. Similarly, it is well known
that the Williams Act,l21 the principal federal law regulating the market
for corporate control, makes it difficult for target firms to prevent auc-
tions from occurring. This is primarily because the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) has construed the law to require that initial
tender offerors keep their offers open for at least twenty business days.
An additional ten business days must be added after any increase in the
price offered, the percentage of shares being bid for, or the dealer's solici-
tation fee.122 These federal regulations impede firms' ability to decide for
themselves what sales strategy will best maximize share value and dimin-
ish firms' incentives to become acquirers, since they create bidding envi-
ronments in which bidders cannot recover their sunk estimation costs.
The process is further impeded by recent decisions of the Delaware Su-
preme Court.
III. THE DELAWARE JUDICIARY'S PREFERENCE FOR AUCTIONS
The starting point for any analysis of the Delaware judiciary's views
on auction theory is the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Rev-
lon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 123 This case involved
what began as a friendly takeover bid by Pantry Pride, which offered to
pay between $40 and $50 per share for Revlon. The board of directors of
Revlon responded to Pantry Pride's offer by undergoing a restructuring of
the corporation, which significantly increased the firm's leverage. Pantry
Pride's response to this corporate restructuring was to make a series of
hostile tender offers for Revlon at a range from $42 to $56 ¥.! per share.
In the midst of this process, Revlon began to consider proposals from two
other potential outside acquirers. As the Delaware court noted, both of
these acquirers intended to finance their acquisition through the issuance
of high yield Gunk) bonds, and to repay the principal and interest on
these securities, at least in part, through the sale of Revlon assets.124
Once the sale of the company became inevitable, the court held that
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (1982).
122. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1988). See L. Loss. FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 576 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that it "startles a bit" to see the SEC use its power to pro-
mulgate time periods in this way).
123. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
124. ld. at 177, 180.
HeinOnline -- 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 110 1990
110 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
"[t]he whole question of defensive measures became moot. The directors'
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company."125 It has been argued that Revlon should be read to apply only
in the context of a bust-up takeover.126 This reading of the case is some-
what implausible, however, because it does not provide any guidance as to
how much restructuring leads to a "bust-up." Thus, in the absence of any
sound theoretical justification for distinguishing bust-up takeovers from
other takeovers from the shareholders' perspective, it is unclear precisely
when the obligation to conduct an auction is triggered.
More plausibly, it has been argued that Revlon requires that an auc-
tion be conducted only when the target board of directors has a conflict of
interest in deciding whether to accept or reject a particular merger propo-
sal.127 In Revlon, it was thought that the ability of the board to consider
outside bids was compromised because some board members were to par-
ticipate in the buyout.128 Later, the board was considered compromised
because of a buyer agreement to protect the board against civil liability in
any future suit brought by certain note holders.129
Regardless of possible readings of Revlon, it is clear that some law-
yers and investment bankers are of the opinion that Revlon imposes a
general duty on corporate directors to engage in an open-ended auction
once a target company is "in play." Revlon's progeny provide some sup-
port for this conclusion. In Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Indus-
tries,130 for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery interpreted Revlon
as imposing "an obligation on the part of the board of directors, once it is
clear to the board that the co~poration is to be subject to a change in
control, to attempt to maximize the amount to be received by sharehold-
ers."13l This language would pose no difficulties except for the fact that
the court erroneously assumed that "maximizing the amount to be re-
ceived by shareholders" is synonymous with holding an open auction.
But, as previously established, this is not the case because holding an
open auction may decrease, rather than increase, the value shareholders
can receive when the sale of a firm is viewed from an ex ante perspective.
In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,132 the Delaware Su-
preme Court repeated its conclusion that directors should serve as auc-
tioneers whenever it becomes "apparent" that the sale of the target
125. Id. at 182.
126. Reder, The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to Act as Auc-
tioneer, 44 Bus. LAW. 275, 278-79 (1989).
127. Herzel & Shepro, Negotiated Acquisitions: The Impact of Competition in the
United States, 44 Bus. LAW. 301, 314 (1989).
128. Id. at 313.
129. Id.
130. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1193,502 at 97,218 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 16, 1987).
131. Id.
132. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. Ch. 1987).
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company is "inevitable."133 The bottom line is that the law is quite un-
clear. Revlon establishes that auctions are required, at least in certain
circumstances. However, they are not required in all circumstances. In
particular, where there is no conflict of interest between the bidder and
the target board of directors, "Revlon does not . . . require . . . that
before every corporate merger agreement can validly be entered into, the
constituent corporations must be 'shopped' or, more radically, an auction
process undertaken."I34
Regardless of the nuances in the law, it appears clear that the pres-
ence or absence of conflicts of interest and favoritism will be important
factors in a determination of whether an open auction will be deemed
mandatory. Another important factor will be whether target management
.actually has decided to sell the firm or not. Thus, the target's board does
not appear to be able to invoke a poison pill to stop an auction once it is
in progress,135 or to favor one bidder over another in the context of an
ongoing auction.136 To evaluate the auction process within the context of
a management buyout, the controversy surrounding Black and Decker's
hostile bid for American Standard is particularly instructive.137
In the wake of Black and Decker's unfriendly bid, American Stan-
dard proposed a corporate restructuring that was the functional
equivalent of a management buyout because it would have given control
of the company to management and to an employee stock ownership plan
(ESOP).138 In addition, the restructuring would have cashed out virtually
all of American Standard's public shareholders. This restructuring would
have been triggered by a change of control, such as a hostile takeover
bid.139 The court essentially found that management's recapitalization
plan would have been the functional equivalent of a management buyout
and invalidated the plan because it was held to unfairly favor manage-
ment's bid.140 Thus, regardless of whether a corporation can avoid a gen-
eral obligation to hold an auction in a struggle for control, it seems clear
that an auction must be held if the firm is contemplating any corporate
restructuring, such as a management buyout in which incumbent manage-
ment will emerge as the dominant party, and the planned sale appears to
favor incumbents over outside rival bidders.
Lock-up options issued by management in the midst of battles for
corporate control also have been looked down upon by courts. Lock-ups
give the firm to which they are issued rights to purchase specified assets
of the target firm at a particular price when triggered by a particular
133. Id. at 1344.
134. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.
1988).
135. CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 411-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
136. Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del.
1988).
137. See id.
138. Herzel and Shepro, supra note 127, at 317.
139. Id.
140. Black & Decker Corp., 682 F. Supp. at 786.
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event. In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc.,w SCM, the
target firm, granted Merrill Lynch the right to buy two businesses, which
accounted for more than half of its income, for $430 million if anyone
other then Merrill Lynch acquired more than one-third of SCM's com-
mon stock.142 This lock-up option was approved by the SCM board of
directors. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, invalidated the
agreement as a breach of management's fiduciary duties to shareholders
on the grounds that the SCM was unable to prove that the option's strike
price was within the range of fair value.143
But the granting of lock-up options appears to be perfectly consistent
with the auction literature. By raising a bidder's probability of success, a
target firm can also raise the amount it is willing to invest in search con-
cerning the target, and hence the amount a bidder is willing to pay. Simi-
larly, by granting a lock-up option, a target firm can induce a previously
unwilling bidder to consider making a bid for a firm. This is a particularly
important consideration in a takeover situation where the costs of entry
into a bidding contest are quite high due to the estimation costs and bid
preparation costs necessary to formulate an intelligent, legally acceptable
bid.
Thus, the dominant state law on corporate takeovers holds that an
open-ended auction must be conducted once it is determined that a firm
is to be sold. While this strategy might be optimal for some firms, for
others it will discourage bidding, thus reducing shareholder wealth. In
particular, Delaware's law reduces shareholder wealth by making it diffi-
cult for directors of target firms to control the rules governing the con-
duct of public corporation sales. First, directors who do not think that
conducting an auction will maximize firm value will be reluctant to an-
nounce that their firm is for sale, since such an announcement will trigger
the Delaware duty to auction. Second, the law makes it difficult for auc-
tioneers to end auctions. This makes it difficult for bidders to calculate
their bid costs, and thereby lowers the amount they are willing to bid. It
also makes it difficult for bidders to recover their sunk prebid costs. Fi-
nally, the law forbids sellers from preferring certain buyers over others. In
a world in which some buyers are more credible, this rule harms share-
holders by forcing firms to expend resources dealing with potential buyers
they do not believe are serious. Similarly, by forcing sellers to deal with
all buyers, sellers are prevented from acting to reduce buyers' search costs
by identifying specific purchasers whom the sellers believe to be particu-
larly appropriate.
IV. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR REQUIRING THE BOARD TO HOLD AN AUCTION
As noted above, a common feature of the academic and judicial com-
mentary on takeovers is its rigidity. Both camps favor a single rule to
141. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
142. Id. at 267.
143. Id. at 273.
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govern the conduct of all sales of control of publicly held corporations.
While important differences exist about the particular rules favored by
the various camps, all seem to agree that one rule will benefit all share-
holders of all firms, despite the important differences in bidding situa-
tions that exist in the real world.
A. Agency Costs
There is another important common feature among the judicial and
academic commentary. Both camps are overwhelmingly concerned with
the problem of agency costs within the public corporation, and this signif-
icantly influences their views on the proper method for transferring con-
trol. For example, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel argue that
target firms' managers "have a substantial interest in ... preserving
their salaries and status."144 They even claim that "the less effective they
have been as managers, the greater their interest in preventing a take-
over."145 Because there is no way to differentiate between honest efforts
to conduct an auction and resistance that simply entrenches incumbent
management (and because resistance consumes real resources), all resis-
tance should be prohibited, according to Easterbrook and Fischel.146
Where Easterbrook and Fischel argue that passivity is the best
means for insuring that management does not resist takeovers for the
wrong reason, Bebchuk argues that his auction rule works best. Bebchuk
asserts that:
[m]anagement cannot be trusted to use these [defensive] tactics pri-
marily to gain a limited delay that will facilitate a bidding contest
. . . . [I]t may employ these tactics to avoid a takeover altogether and
perpetuate its control .... Alternatively, it may use them to distort
an existing contest among prospective acquirers . . . in order to favor
one that offers a better deal for management. . . . Therefore, time for
making competing bids should be provided solely by regulatory man-
date, and incumbent management should be barred from actions that
obstruct any tender offer.147
Professor Gilson begins his article on defensive tactics by explaining
that:
[t]ender offers present an obvious and inherent conflict of interest be-
tween management and shareholders. On the one hand, an offer pro-
vides shareholders with the opportunity to sell their shares for a
substantial premium over market price. On the other hand, the tender
offer is the principal mechanism by which management can be forcibly
unseated from control.148
144. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 47, at 1175.
145. [d.
146. [d.
147. Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1054.
148. Gilson, supra note 87, at 819.
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These claims, while plausible, are unconvincing as a complete expla-
nation of managerial behavior. Agency costs of major dimensions exist
within the large publicly held fum. But it is not clear why these agency
costs inevitably will manifest themselves in the form of tactics that ob-
struct takeovers. For two reasons, it seems equally plausible that the op-
posite agency problem will exist, and that managers will encourage
changes in control, regardless of whether such changes are in the share-
holders' interest.
1. Side payments
First, while resistance allows incumbent management to retain their
positions of power and authority, refusing to resist is a method by which
incumbent managers can extract sizeable side payments from bidders.
These side payments can come in the form of severance packages such as
golden parachute arrangements, or in the form of "consulting fees" for
agreeing to provide management services to the firm's new officers and
directors.
From the perspective of bidding firms, it often will be far less costly
to "buy off" incumbent management by providing them with side pay-
ments than it will be to face staunch resistance from incumbent manage-
ment. It is not unheard of for resistance to consume tens of millions of
dollars in bidding firm resources.149 A bidding firm, of course, will prefer
to reduce its takeover costs by avoiding these payments. Splitting the
savings with incumbent management is one means to accomplish this.
Similarly, it is likely that at least some incumbent managers will prefer to
obtain side payments to resisting and keeping their jobs.
2. Risk aversion
The second reason incumbent management may choose not to resist
is related to the first. Aside from the non-pecuniary benefits associated
with managers' retaining their jobs, incumbent management is basically
choosing between two income streams when deciding whether or not to
offer resistance. Managers will value their current positions at the present
value of their future earnings, discounted by the extremely high
probability that they will be unsuccessful in remaining independent.
These streams are unstable for two reasons. First, they depend on the
fate of the firm. If the firm goes bankrupt, discharges its top manage-
ment, or simply suffers low earnings, the income of the firm's top manag-
ers will decline or disappear. Second, as noted above, putting up
resistance does not guarantee that managers will keep their jobs. Indeed,
under current law which mandates auctions of firms that are for sale, the
odds of remaining truly independent in the face of a takeover battle are
exceedingly low.
149. See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 47, at 1176 n.39 (describing two contests
for control, one in which the fees paid to lawyers, investment bankers and other participants
amounted to $17 million, and one in which such fees amounted to $15 million).
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Thus, the payoffs to management from successful resistance are ex-
ceedingly uncertain. By contrast, the benefits of a side payment from a
bidder in exchange for an implicit promise not to resist, which often will
come in a lump sum severance payment, are extremely certain. Thus, side
payments will be especially preferred by risk averse managers because
they reduce the uncertainty associated with expected future earnings.
B. MBOs: A Useful Illustration
The above discussion suggests that the existence of agency costs does
not provide a justification either for requiring or prohibiting open-ended
auctions for target firms. Obviously, if a court concludes that a particular
defensive strategy has been adopted or rejected solely because it furthers
managers' interests at the expense of shareholder welfare, then the strat-
egy should be abrogated. But as indicated above, there is no a priori rea-
son to conclude that managers will always respond to takeovers with too
much resistance: They may respond with too much passivity.
Thus, takeover policy should not be based on the assumption that
agency costs only manifest themselves in the form of too much resistance.
The policy implications of this point can be illustrated with reference to
the legal treatment of management buyouts/llo because these transactions
appear to represent an obvious situation in which the sales techniques
selected by incumbent management should be heavily regulated. Mter all,
in these transactions, management clearly has a strong incentive to select
the sales strategy that maximizes its own chances of winning. These
transactions represent a clear conflict of interest because management is
simultaneously acting on behalf of the shareholders to determine whether
a sale is in their interest, and on their own behalf as prospective
purchasers.1111
In response to this perceived conflict of interest, courts have invali-
dated a variety of techniques used by target management to give them-
selves a heavy advantage in bidding. Lock-up options/1l2 no-shop
clauses1113 and break-up fees/54 all have been invalidated on the grounds
that corporate boards should not be allowed to favor the management
group over outside bidders.
It is significant that the judicial antagonism towards preferential
treatment for incumbent management in management buyouts (MBOs) is
not mitigated even where management's proposals are approved by an
150. A management buyout involves the purchase of the assets of a public corporation
pursuant to a statutory merger or other transaction in which members of former manage-
ment acquire a significant equity interest in the successor corporation.
151. Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV., 730, 732 (1985).
152. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 271 (2d Cir.
1986).
153. Bryer & Vlakakis, Enforcement of No-Shop Clauses, N.Y.L.J., December 10,
1984, at 33, col. 6.
154. Revlon, Inc. V. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del.
1986).
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independent committee of the firm's board of directors. In Edelman v.
FruehauflSlS for example, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's in-
junction prohibiting a management buyout of Fruehauf. Management had
obtained a break-up fee and a no-shop clause, which gave management an
advantage in an auction over outside bidders. Management's bid was ap-
proved by a committee of independent directors, but the court struck it
down, nevertheless, on the grounds that the board's goals were "not to
create a fair bidding process but to make sure that the managers . . .
bought the company and that other bidders would be turned away/'IG6
This sort of result is not consistent with the analysis presented in
this article. For a variety of reasons, it may be efficient for a firm that
wishes to transfer control of itself to stifle an auction and favor incum-
bent management. The existence of a conflict of interest between man-
agement and shareholders in a management buyout does not detract from
this conclusion. To mitigate this conflict of interest, the right to deter-
mine the appropriate sales technique should be delegated to an impartial
group of directors. But this disinterested group of board members should
be able to select the most efficient sales technique and should be able to
negotiate exclusively with the firm's incumbent management if, in their
business judgment, they determine that that is the best way to sell the
company.
Managers may clearly value control of their company more highly
than any other group. Where this is the case, shareholders will benefit
most by selling their firm to a management buyout group in a direct sale
rather than in an auction. The direct sale often will be superior to the
auction where the highest valuing purchaser is known, because the costs
of holding the auction can be avoided.
An examination of some of the likely sources of gain from manage-
ment buyouts indicates that negotiation with management, rather than
open auction, may be the best way to sell a company in certain situations.
In particular, managers are likely to value their firm more highly than
others where managers have made firm-specific, human capital invest-
ments in information about the company for which they work, and can
best exploit that investment by buying the firm for which they work.
A firm-specific, human capital investment is one in which a manager
has developed a skill that is particular to a specific employer.IG7 Professor
Coffee has observed that there are unique patterns of communication
within a large corporate structure that "necessitate that special interper-
sonal skills be acquired to function in individual corporate environ-
ments."11S8 In a situation such as this, incumbent management will be
willing to pay more than other bidders for the firm in order to protect the
155. 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
156. Id. at 887.
157. G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPE-
CIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 26-28 (2d ed. 1975).
158. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. I, 17 n.42 (1986) (citations omitted).
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value of these investments. Similarly, where management has not made
firm-specific, human capital investments, but where the value of the firm
would be enhanced if such investments were made, management might
value the firm more highly than other bidders because ownership by man-
agement would prevent these investments from being exploited by
shareholders.159
In these cases, managers will value the firm more highly than outsid-
ers, and hence will be willing to pay more. The negotiating team of inde-
pendent directors can benefit shareholders by charging the management
group the highest price that an outside bidder would be willing to pay
plus a share of the costs saved by not holding a costly auction. The gains
will be shared by the shareholders and the managers.
Another situation in which management negotiation will be better
than holding an auction is where managers have information that sug-
gests that the firm's shares are undervalued in the marketplace, even
though information is not fully reflected in the firm's share price because
it is costly to verify. In this situation, the firm's share price could be ad-
justed to its correct level by holding an auction. The auction participants
would be more willing than general market participants to spend the re-
sources necessary to verify the information known to management, be-
cause the winner of the auction would be able to capture the full
difference between the market's value of the firm's shares and their true
value. But money spent verifying information already known to manage-
ment would be a waste of real resources. The price that purchasers would
be willing to pay would be reduced by the amounts they expended to
verify management's information.160
Obviously, incumbent management should be required to disclose the
information in question to the independent directors engaged in negotia-
tions to sell the firm. But these directors should be able to decide for
themselves whether an auction or a negotiated sale to incumbent manage-
ment would be the optimal means for disposing of the assets of the target
firm.
A closely related argument applies in a situation where a firm's
shares are "undervalued" simply because of the very existence of agency
costs within the corporation. Rational shareholders will reduce the price
they are willing to pay for stock by an amount equal to any expected
divergence from a policy of strict profit maximization by a firm's officers
159. [d. at 24 (arguing that shareholders can exploit managers' firm-specific, human
capital investments by selling firm to hostile acquirer after such investments have been
made).
160. It might be argued that the expenditure of real resources by other bidders is
irrelevant because incumbent management, which does not have to make these expendi-
tures, inevitably will win any auction that is held. This is erroneous for two reasons. First,
the costs incurred by the other bidders remain a waste of real resources, and hence socially
undesirable. Second, the incumbent management teanx doing the management buyout will
spend more on legal fees, investment banking fees and related costs in an auction than they
will in a negotiated sale, and the cost of these expenditures will be borne by the target firm's
public shareholders.
HeinOnline -- 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 118 1990
118 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
and directors. Where a firm undergoes a management buyout, agency
costs are reduced dramatically, and the gulf between ownership and con-
trol is essentially eliminated. A management buyout allows shareholders
to obtain some of the gains associated with this radical diminution in
agency costs.
In all probability, incumbent management is the group that will have
the best estimate of the possible savings by eliminating agency costs.
Consequently, this group is the likely candidate to purchase the firm in a
leveraged acquisition. After the appropriate disclosures are made to the
bargaining team of independent directors, it does not appear that there
are any gains to shareholders available from holding an auction. Rather,
the costs of the auction would simply diminish the size of the gains avail-
able to shareholders.
A final situation in which a negotiated sale to incumbent manage-
ment would be preferrable to an auction occurs when the buyout is being
undertaken simply to avoid the regulatory burdens of the securities laws,
or where the target firm is being acquired for certain tax credits that the
target was previously unable to exploit, or for the substantial interest de-
ductions available on debt financing.161 In these situations, there are no
gains for bidders to invest resources in obtaining information about the
target, because all of the value enhancement associated with the takeover
is endogenous to the target. Adding additional bidders to an auction is
not going to produce a higher price, because all bidders will value the
savings equally. Consequently, holding an auction increases the cost of a
transfer of control without resulting in a concomitant increase in bid
price. Under these circumstances, if management is willing to purchase
the firm, there is no reason to prevent managers from negotiating an ap-
propriate price with independent directors.
CONCLUSION
Lucian Bebchuk has described his regulatory regime for transferring
control of public corporations as the sole owner standard because, in his
view, it is the regulatory system that treats shares of stock in a publicly
held corporation as though they were held by a single owner.162 As
Bebchuk notes, these sole owners are most likely to select the sales strat-
egy that maximizes the value of the assets being sold. Professor Bebchuk
is clearly correct that the sole owner standard is the appropriate reference
point. Indeed, the point is so obvious as to be trivial. The difficult ques-
tion is determining which, among the virtually infinite array of available
sales strategies, would be the one that a sole owner would select.
The point of this article is that, contrary to the views of the existing
161. Until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, management buyouts generated substantial
tax advantages because the transactions permitted a stepped-up basis in target firm assets
which enabled firms to obtain additional depreciation deductions for depleted assets and to
decrease recognized gains on the eventual sale of assets.
162. Bebchuk, supra note 85, at 216.
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dominant critics, there is no single answer to this question. Indeed, it
seems clear that open auctions will greatly benefit some firms. Similarly,
selling a firm in a negotiated transaction with a single buyer will maxi-
mize firm value (and thereby conform to the sole owner standard) for
other firms. In particular, auction literature shows that sometimes addi-
tional bidders can create value in the assets for which they are bidding by
making important discoveries about them. In these cases, adding addi-
tional bidders to an auction will enhance the price shareholders will be
able to obtain in a transfer of control. On the other hand, sometimes bid-
ders will not be able to add very much, and any investments in informa-
tion by bidding firms will be wasted. In these cases, auctions simply are
likely to reduce the price for which a target firm can be sold. This article
has provided numerous other examples of situations in which either auc-
tions, or negotiated sales, or some hybrid sales mechanism might be pre-
ferred by target shareholders.
Finally, this article has shown that the undeniable presence of agency
costs within a corporation should not cause us to favor auctions over ne-
gotiated sales. The existence of a wide divergence of interest between
managers and shareholders should mandate that a board of directors ap-
point a group of independent directors to serve as negotiating agents. But
if the optimal means of disposing of a firm's assets is to sell those assets
in a negotiated sale to incumbent management, then clearly that is how
the firm should be sold.
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